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I. WHAT'S SO GOOD ABOUT SETTLEMENTS? AN ANTHOLOGY OF
"QUALITY" ARGUMENTS
When I was a law student, some 30 years ago, I don't recall hearing
much about settlement. I am sure that my teachers knew there were a lot of
settlements, but they were not worthy of much attention. They were part of
the realm of practical nuts and bolts detail that lay outside learning about the
law; law school was about cases that were adjudicated.
Today, "most cases settle" has become commonplace in discussions of
civil justice, even in law schools. This is a welcome corrective to the naive
tendency to speak as if every case were tried and subjected to appellate review.
But this overtly descriptive observation lends itself to a variety of rhetorical
uses. It is used to indicate that settlement is the natural outcome of litigation,
to imply that settlement is what litigants want, and to justify efforts to main-
tain or increase the portion of cases that settle. I want to examine the appro-
bation of settlement that is linked to these connotations. But first, it should be
* Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law and South Asian Studies, University of Wiscon-
sin-Madison. This paper was originally prepared for the Working Group on Judicial
Ethics of the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy of the University of Maryland.
An enlarged version will appear in THE USE AND ABUSE OF JUDICIAL POWER (David
Luban ed.). I am indebted to Leonard Riskin and John Esser for helpful comments on
an earlier draft.
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noted that even as a simple description, this observation requires some
qualification.
It is indeed true that settlement is the modal disposition of civil cases in
most courts in the United States and probably has been so for a long time.
However, we should not exaggerate its predominance. Oft-cited figures of
85% or 90% or 95% are misleading; they represent the portion of civil cases
that do not go to trial.' But that is not quite the same as "settled" if settle-
ment means resolved by agreement between the contending parties, rather
than by the decision of an authoritative decision-maker. Cases may be dis-
posed of by authoritative decisions in other ways than by trial. My colleague,
Bert Kritzer, analyzing some 1,649 cases in federal and state courts in five
localities, found that although only 7% terminated through trial, another 15%
terminated through some other form of adjudication (arbitration, dismissal on
the merits), and in a further 9% settlement followed a ruling on a significant
motion.'
Settlement of civil cases has long been praised as desirable in individual
cases. In the past, settlement has also been appreciated for its salutary effects
on the judicial system-relieving congestion and saving court resources. Settle-
ment has gained acceptance as something that courts, as well as others, legiti-
mately strive to produce.$ A large number of judges do participate actively in
the settlement of some cases. This judicial intervention meets with the general
approval of lawyers.4
Let me begin with a little anthology of assertions about the estimable
qualities of settlements drawn from judges and legal scholars. Since a number
of current attacks on the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) "movement"
seem to identify it as the promoter and popularizer of settlement, it is worth
noting that this catalog of praise is drawn from those who are professionally
concerned with adjudication and that most of these views predate the modern
ADR movement.
A. At a 1976 seminar for newly-appointed federal district judges, they
were counselled by a veteran judge that "[o]ne of the fundamental principles
1. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, Table
C-4 (1986). For example, in the federal district courts in 1986, the portion of civil
cases that were terminated "during or after trial" was 4.2% of all terminations. It
should be noted that this includes cases that settled after the commencement of trial.
Id.
2. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Grey, 70 JUDICATURE
161, 163 (1986). Default judgments were omitted from this computation.
3. See Galanter, A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge: Judicial Mediation in
the United States, 12 J. L. & Soc'Y 1, 8-15 (1985); see also Galanter, The Emergence
of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257, 261-62 (1986).
4. See W. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS: LITIGATORS' VIEWS ABOUT APPRO-
PRIATE ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES (1985); Wall, Rude
& Schiller, Judicial Participation in Settlement, 1984 Mo. J. Disp. RES. 25 (1984).
[Vol. 1988
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of judicial administration is that, in most cases, the absolute result of a trial is
not as high a quality of justice as is the freely negotiated, give a little take a
little settlement."9
5
B. An outline distributed to the new judges reiterated that:
In most controversies, most court cases, the highest quality of justice is not
the all or nothing, black or white end result of a trial, but is in the grey
area-in most cases a freely negotiated settlement is a higher quality of jus-
tice which is obtainable earlier and at less cost. Approximately 90 percent of
all suits filed in federal courts are disposed of without trial.
C. Chief Judge William J. Campbell of the Northern District of Illinois is
cited by a sympathetic observer as holding that "[w]hat just requires ... is a
settlement acceptable to both sides, not a determination that one side is at
fault and must compensate the other for damages inflicted."' Judge Campbell
points to the preference of parties for settlements, taking their prevalence as
evidence of their desirability and hence of the quality of the courts'
performance.$
D. Chief Judge Noel Fox of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan identifies himself as among those who "accept
settlement as a preferred means of disposition."' Among the many advantages
of settlement are:
Promotion of a result closely related to the merits of the parties' position: the
parties and their lawyers have more accurate knowledge of the value of their
respective cases than does the court or a jury. An agreement on settlement
can thus be expected to reflect the parties' evaluation of the actual merits of
the case. This produces results which are probably as close to the ideal of
justice as we are capable of producing. 10
Thus, settlement avoids the harsh and extreme judgments that may be or-
dained by the law in favor of a middle course.
E. The Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct contained the
observation that "although litigation is wholly legitimate as a means of resolv-
ing controversy, a fairly negotiated settlement generally yields a better
conclusion.""
5. Will, Merhige, & Rubin, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75
F.R.D. 203 (1977).
6. Flanders, Case Management in Federal Courts: Some Controversies and
Some Results, 4 JUST. Sys. J. 147, 150, 165 (1978).
7. Holland, William J. Campbell: Case Study of an Activist U.S. District Judge,
3 JUST. Sys. J. 143, 144 (1977).
8. Id. at 144.
9. Fox, Settlement: Helping the Lawyers to Fulfill Their Responsibility, 53
F.R.D. 129, 134 (1971).
10. Id. at 142. Judge Fox is sensitive to the concern that compromise may reflect
different bargaining advantages unrelated to the merits. Id. at 143.
11. ABA Comm. on Evaluation of Professional Standards, MODEL RULES OF
1988]
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F. Robert Mnookin and William Kornhauser, in their noted "Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law,"1' discuss the advantages of bargained outcomes in
divorce disputes:
There are obvious and substantial savings when a couple can resolve distribu-
tional consequences of divorce without resort to courtroom adjudication. The
financial cost of litigation, both private and public, is minimized. The pain of
a formal adversary proceeding is avoided. Recent psychological studies indi-
cate that children benefit when parents agree on custodial arrangements.
Moreover, a negotiated agreement allows the parties to avoid the risks and
uncertainties of litigation, which may involve all-or-nothing consequences.
Given the substantial delays that often characterize contested judicial pro-
ceedings, agreement can often save time and allow each spouse to proceed
with his or her life. Finally, a consensual solution is by definition more likely
to be consistent with the preferences of each spouse, and acceptable over time,
than would a result imposed by a court."s
G. Melvin Eisenberg, contrasting the negotiation of disputes with their
adjudication, concludes that negotiation can take into account a richer array
of normative principles, while adjudication typically excludes at least some of
the principles that the disputants themselves regard as relevant.14 Thus,
"traditional adjudication may actually be a less principled process than dis-
pute negotiation." 1' This is because, "[i]n most cases of dispute-negotiation
the outcome is heavily determined by the principles, rules, and precedents that
parties invoke.' 1' In negotiation, "a broad spectrum of norms can be taken
into account in a wide variety of ways;"1' 7 adjudication, on the other hand, is
less principled since some principles are excluded from consideration. 1,
Eisenberg also believes that some of the desirable features of pure negoti-
ation of disputes are preserved when opposing lawyers negotiate in the shadow
of formal litigation:
The lawyers are not only able but likely to take all colliding principles into
account; they may take account of subordinate principles; their fact finding
procedures have the simplicity and open texture of all negotiation; they may
be more flexible in their choice of remedies; and within the leeway left by
principles, rules, and precedents, their decisions may turn partly on such fac-
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 35 (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980) (emphasis added). The
proposed ethical regulation of lawyers negotiating was dropped from the Model Rules
as enacted.
12. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
13. Id. at 956-57.
14. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation:L Dispute Settlement and
Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 655-57 (1976).
15. Id. at 657.
16. Id. at 639.
17. Id. at 655.
18. Id. at 657.
[Vol. 1988
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tors as prominence, personal force, and risk preference. On another
level, since each disputant stands in at least a rudimentary interpersonal rela-
tionship to... [one of] the lawyers, the parties are likely to perceive adjudi-
cation-by-lawyers as more human and less threatening than formal
adjudication."
H. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, after examining the efficiency arguments for
settlement and finding them wanting, observes that:
[w]hat settlement offers is a substantive justice that may be more responsive
to the parties' needs than adjudication. Settlement can be particularized to
the needs of the parties, it can avoid win/lose, binary results, provide richer
remedies than the commodification or monetarization of all claims, and
achieve legitimacy through consent. In addition, settlement offers a different
substantive process by allowing participation by the parties as well as the law-
yers. Settlement fosters a communication process that can be more direct and
less stylized than litigation, and affords greater flexibility of procedure and
remedy.' 0
11. COMPARED TO WHAT? SOME PROBLEMS OF ESTIMATING THE QUALITY
OF SETTLEMENTS
The anthology of testimonials listed above could be indefinitely extended.
Clearly many lawyers, judges, scholars, disputants, and onlookers think settle-
ments are pretty good things. In Section III, I will attempt to sort out the
dimensions of goodness attributed to settlements and examine the evidence for
the presence of these virtues. The praise of settlements implies not only that
they display admirable features, but that: (1) they enjoy these features in
greater abundance than at least some of the alternative ways of processing
disputes, and (2) some settlements display these features to a greater extent
than other settlements. Hence, it may be useful, before turning to assertions
about quality, to consider some of the problems of making such comparisons.
Arguments about the relative quality of various instances or species of
dispute processing involve different designs of inference. First, the simplest de-
sign for measuring the quality of a settlement is to compare the settlement of
case X to the adjudication of the same case X. Such one dispute/two process
comparison faces the immediate difficulty that real life does not offer nicely
matched pairs of cases; there is no judicial counterpart of identical twin re-
search. One solution is to compare real adjudication X with imaginary settle-
ment X' (e.g., Texaco v. Pennzoil) or real settlement Y with imaginary adju-
dication Y' (e.g., Agent Orange).21
19. Id. at 665 n.81.
20. Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 504-05 (1985).
21. One dispute/two process comparisons suffer from the same problems when
the processes being compared are not settlement and adjudication, but two modes of
settlement--e.g., bilateral settlement compared with settlement with the aid of a medi-
1988]
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One dispute/two process comparison suffers from another problem. Even
if we had matched pairs, the possible outcomes of a given process applied to a
given situation are variable-different negotiators may produce very different
outcomes in negotiating the same dispute; different lawyers, judges, and juries
can lead to very different results in the same adjudication. Hence, the real
instance that we wish to compare must be certified as somehow typical of the
genre or fully expressive of its potentialities, not an outlier or freak.
And what about the imaginary term of the comparison-the Agent Or-
ange adjudication that did not take place? The attribution of features to this
imaginary instance gives enormous discretion to the impresario of the compar-
ison. What is attributed may be typical (in the sense of modal or median) or
ideal-typical (in the sense of expressing what are thought to be the essential
traits of the dispute-processing mode). The imaginary resolution can display
the optimal or heroic or catastrophic. There may be some admixture of empiri-
cal generalization or projection from the known features of the dispute in
question. Some of these attributes will be fairly uncontroversial--e.g., the time
and expense of adjudication-but others are based on much thinner supposi-
tion--e.g., effects on the parties, the perceptions of wider audiences, and so
forth.
To avoid comparison with an imaginary instance, we can compare X with
a case that is similar in all important respects. But this involves the obvious
difficulty of matching cases. This takes us right back to the problem of varia-
bility within types and the typicality of the outcome.
Second, there is the two instances/one process comparison. If we recog-
nize that successive instances of the same mode of dispute resolution applied
to the same (or similar) case(s) will result in a range of different outcomes, we
can compare the outcome in one of these instances, X', with the outcome in
another, X2. That is, we can compare one settlement of a case of a specific
type with another settlement of a similar case and talk about a good settle-
ment as opposed to a not-so-good settlement. Here we are not talking about
the virtues inherent in the species, but about what gives individual members
their virtuous qualities.
For the most part, the literature that we shall examine does not address
this intra-species comparison directly. But the possibility of such comparisons
is implied by discussion of what is good about settlement in general. For ex-
ample, if settlement is preferable to adjudication because it is cheaper and
leads to greater party satisfaction, then presumably in two similar cases, set-
tlement Z' is better than settlement Z' because it involves fewer costs and
produces more party satisfaction. s What is good about settlement in general
ator, or with settlement promoted by a judge at a settlement conference, or settlement
after summary jury trial.
22. See Sarat, The "'New Formalism" in Disputing and Dispute Processing, 21
L. & Soc'y REV 695 (1988).
23. The problems of assuring similarity are the same here as in the two disputes/
[Vol. 1988
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provides us at least some guidance as to what is good about particular
settlements.
Third, to escape the difficulties of matching cases for purposes of compar-
ison by either of these models, we can compare institutional regimes for han-
dling a whole class of cases that exemplify or constitute a particular type of
dispute. That is, we can compare the set of outcomes produced by application
of one dispute resolution mode to one type of dispute (settlements X1, X', etc.)
with the set produced by another mode applied to a similarly constituted class
(adjudications Y1, Y2, etc.). But this strategy encounters the matching prob-
lem on a larger scale. Particularly where one of the processes being compared
serves as a screening device for use of the other, there is the danger that the
groups will be systematically different in important respects. Thus, for exam-
ple, Neil Vidmar found that cases that were resolved by mediation in an Onta-
rio small claims court where "mediation hearings" were mandatory differed
from adjudicated ones in the degree to which defendants admitted liability."
Once we move from comparing a single instance to comparing a class of
cases of a given type of dispute, we encounter the further problem that "types
of dispute" is not entirely independent of the mode of dispute resolution. The
characteristics of disputes are not fixed and unchangeable, but may be influ-
enced by the way that actors undertake to resolve them." Thus, a set of dis-
putes that are settled may, in the process, be defined by the actors quite differ-
ently than a set that are adjudicated.
Finally, comparisons of settlement to adjudication are confounded by the
fact that settlement of lawsuits is not really an independent and self-subsistent
institution. One can think of negotiation as a free-standing process, in which
the counters (principles, precedents, arguments about fairness, utility, threats
of adverse consequences) are drawn from the situation of the parties in a
world in which the parties and their audiences see this process as plenary and
independent. Many kinds of negotiation have this relatively free-standing
character--e.g., my negotiation with the dean about teaching assignments, or
dispute resolution among the businessmen described in Stewart Macaulay's
classic study." But when we move to the settlement of a dispute in which a
lawsuit has been filed or where a threat to do so is implicit, negotiation does
one process model discussed above.
24. Vidmar, An Assessment of Mediation in a Small Claims Court, 41 J. Soc.
IssuEs 127 (1985).
25. On the construction and transformation of disputes, see Galanter, Adjudica-
tion, Litigation, and Related Phenomena in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1986);
Mather & Yngvesson, Language. Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes, 15 L
& Soc'y REv. 775 (1980-81); Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transfor-
mation of Disputes: Naming. Blaming, Claiming , 15 L. & Soc'v REv. 631 (1980-
81).
26. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. Soc. REV 55-69 (1963).
19881
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not enjoy this kind of free-standing, plenary character. It now takes place "in
the shadow of the law."' 1
The outcomes in particular instances of dispute processing are influenced
both by the process and the distribution of entitlements (and strategic re-
sources and cultural models) radiating from the law-adjudication complex.
The outcomes of negotiation are not the product of negotiation per se but of
negotiation by particular negotiations in a particular legal setting. Hence, the
comparison of adjudicated case X' with settlement X, negotiated in the
shadow of the legal setting L, cannot tell us whether negotiation per se is
superior to adjudication per se as a way of dealing with cases of type X. At
most it could tell us whether, once we have a legal setting (including adjudica-
tion institutions) of a given type, settlement in its shadow is preferable to full
adjudication in a given case. And of course, even if it is preferable in a given
case, that does not imply that it is better in all cases. Hence, comparisons
between adjudication and cases negotiated in its shadow say nothing about
negotiation versus adjudication as plenary ways of resolving disputes.
We see that each strategy of comparison is subject to serious problems.
We might reach the despairing conclusion that these difficulties rule out any
possibility of judging the quality of dispute processing. Yet we find that the
world is full of people who think they know when an instance or bundle of
processes/results are better than another instance or another bundle. Dispu-
tants and their profession advisors cannot avoid choosing dispute processes; nor
can policy makers avoid judgments about what processes are best suited to
what kinds of disputes. Comparative judgments of the "quality" of the pro-
cess/outcome are unavoidable in practice as well as difficult in theory. An
examination of the grounds for such judgments will not give us definitive an-
swers, but it may lead us to ask some useful questions.
111. THE CATALOG
My little anthology (Section I, supra) suggests that there are lots of dis-
tinct if entangled reasons for thinking that settlements are good. I try in this
"Catalog" to extract the leading contenders and group them into several
clusters.
A. The Party Preference Arguments
1. Party pursuit, i.e., that settlement (rather than adjudication) is
what the parties seek. In other words, they "vote with their feet";
2. Party satisfaction, i.e., that settlement leads to greater party
satisfaction;
27. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 12; Galanter, Justice in Many
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3. Party needs, i.e., that settlement is more responsive to the needs or
underlying preferences of parties;
B. The Cost Reduction Arguments
4. Party savings, i.e., that settlement saves the parties time and re-
sources, spares them unwanted risk and aggravation;
5. Court efficiency, i.e., that settlement saves the courts time and re-
sources, conserving their scarce resources (especially judicial atten-
tion); it makes courts less congested and better able to serve other
cases;
C. The Superior Outcomes Arguments
6. Golden mean, i.e., that settlement is superior because it gravitates
to a position between the original positions of the parties; because it
involves a process of compromise that gets the parties to such an
intermediate position;
7. Superior knowledge, i.e., that settlement is based on superior
knowledge of the facts and the parties' preferences;
8. Normative richness, i.e., that settlements are more principled, in-
fused with a wider range of norms, and permit the actors to be
loyal to a wider range of normative concerns;
9. Inventiveness, i.e., that settlements display a wider range of out-
comes, greater flexibility in solutions, and admit more inventiveness
in devising remedies, etc.;
10. More compliance, i.e., that parties are more likely to comply with
dispositions reached by settlement; and
11. Superior general effects, i.e., that the radiating effects of settle-
ment on other actors will be preferable to those of adjudication.
I have divided these claims about quality into three clusters, which I have
labelled "Party Preference Arguments," "Cost Reduction Arguments," and
"Superior Outcomes Arguments." The latter two represent the two basic ways
of arguing about the quality of settlements. Cost reduction arguments claim
that settlements achieve what adjudication achieves but sooner, cheaper, and
with less aggravation. Superior outcomes arguments claim that settlements en-
tail richer processes and/or more felicitous outcomes. Cost reduction argu-
ments take settlements as (happily) truncated adjudications; superior out-
comes arguments take adjudications as failed settlements. For the former,
settlement is an answer to high transaction costs; for the latter, it is an answer
to the inherent limitations of adjudication. The party preference cluster offers
a series of measures which are for the most part taken to be indicators of
either lower cost or superior product. But there are some readings of party
preference that identify it as a species of superior product.
1988]
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IV. Is IT SO? WHAT WE KNOW AND DON'T KNOW ABOUT THE QUALITY OF
SETTLEMENTS
A. The Party Preference Arguments
1. Party pursuit. Parties often seek settlement or satisfactory adjustment
rather than justice. Analyzing a survey of Detroit area residents, Leon May-
hew found that the proportion of respondents reporting serious problems who
sought "justice" or legal vindication (as opposed to a satisfactory adjustment)
was tiny in all areas other than discrimination." Only 4% of those with seri-
ous problems connected with expensive purchases sought "justice" as did 2%
of those with neighborhood problems." But 31 % of those reporting discrimi-
nation problems sought "justice."'"
Likewise, Sally Merry and Susan Silbey found that residents of a New
England city turn to courts only as a last resort in addressing neighborhood
problems.8 Alfred Conard and his associates found that among those injured
in automobile accidents, very few thought it was generally a good thing to
sue.3 2 Asked, "How do you feel in general about suing people .. .," only 16 %
replied that one should "sue whenever possible" or "sue when one cannot col-
lect otherwise.""3 Seventy-seven percent (77%) thought one should "settle
without suit if possible" or "always settle without suit."'' 4 We know, too, that
in a vast number of cases, filing is a tactical move to pressure the other party
to negotiate or to grant appropriate relief.
The existence of a general preference for settlement does not mean that
the pursuit of settlement in any particular instance is an informed and un-
coerced expression of such a preference. The selection of settlement in a par-
ticular instance may be based on incomplete or faulty information about alter-
natives. Or, it may be based on accurate information that indicates that
adjudication or some other alternatives that might be preferred are so flawed
that settlement, though unsatisfactory, is the best of the available evils. In
some settings, lawyers expend a great deal of effort in "educating" their cli-
ents about the virtues of settlement when compared to the cost, uncertainty,
28. Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 L. &
Soc'Y REV. 401, 413 (1975). Steele found that only a minority of complainants to a
Consumer Fraud Bureau wanted "public oriented remedies" rather than private relief.
Steele, Fraud Dispute and the Consumer: Responding to Consumer Complaints, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 1107, 1140 (1975).
29. Id. at 413.
30. Id.
31. Merry & Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of
Dispute, 9 JUST. Svs. J. 151, 172-73 (1985).
32. A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMO-
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and arbitrariness of adjudication.'
Hence, the "voting with their feet" argument-that the goodness of set-
tlement is evidenced by the fact that a lot of cases are settled--carries little
persuasiveness unless it is accompanied by some evidence that settlements pro-
duce results that are better in some ascertainable way. Or, if such evidence is
unavailable, then it should be shown that settlement was chosen by knowledge-
able parties in preference to viable and affordable alternatives.
2. Party satisfaction. It is often asserted that parties are more satisfied
with settlements than with adjudicated outcomes. This is plausible in the light
of greater party participation and control, the possibility of individualizing
outcomes to suit the needs of the parties and so forth. But even so, significant
numbers of those who settle are not very happy with the outcome. David
Caplovitz asked debtors in three cities whose wages had been garnished
whether the settlements they reached had been fair. 86 Among the "314 debtors
who... [settled] their debt out of court, only 53 percent considered the settle-
ment to be fair."81 7 And in a study of persons injured in automobile accidents
who filed suit but then settled, Conard and his collaborators found that among
226 claimants who received settlements in serious or litigated automobile acci-
dent claims, 54% thought the settlement was inadequate." Indeed, of those
with serious injuries who had filed suit, 66% thought their settlements were
inadequate."
Howard Erlanger, Elizabeth Chambliss, and Margo Melli interviewed 43
parties to 25 stipulated (that is, settled) divorce cases, closed in 1982 in Dane
County, Wisconsin.40 They found that,
[s]ixteen of the forty-three respondents [37%] in our study are extremely
dissatisfied with their stipulations, and in only seven cases (28%) do both
parties report being satisfied with the result. For most of our cases, then, the
settlement does not equate with a mutually derived agreement; instead of re-
flecting the parties' interests, settlements more typically reflect the parties'
35. Sarat and Felstiner, who observed the interaction of divorce lawyers with
their clients, found that judicial proceedings were represented as an arbitrary, capri-
cious, accident-prone process that "cannot be counted on to protect fundamental rights
or deal in a principled way with the important matters that come before it." Sarat &
Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 L. & Soc'v REv. 93,
105 (1986). See also Erlanger, Chambliss & Melli, Participation and Flexibility in
Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 L. & Soc'y REv. 585
(1987).
36. D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS AND DE-
FAULT 243-45 (1974).
37. Id. at 245.
38. See CONARD, supra note 32, at 274. Fifty-three percent (53%) of the re-
spondents thought that a larger settlement could have been obtained if they "had done
things differently." Id.
39. Id.
40. Erlanger. Chambliss & Melli, supra note 35.
19881
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relative stamina and vulnerability to the pressures of a prolonged dispute."
It is not only these hapless one-shot players who are unhappy with their
settlements. In recent years, we have heard a litany of complaints from insur-
ers and corporate and governmental defendants, telling us that they were
forced to give nuisance settlements or very large settlements that were not
deserved. Nevertheless, one survey of business people found that senior execu-
tives, entrepreneurs, and risk managers estimated that businesses were more
satisfied with lawsuits "settled out of court" than with those "brought to
trial."'" Roughly six of ten of these groups thought businesses were "very sat-
isfied" or "somewhat satisfied" with out-of-court settlements; roughly four of
ten reported satisfaction where lawsuits were brought to trial.'
But all the express discontents with settlements (and with trial outcomes,
for that matter) afford a weak basis for comparative judgment. The judgments
proferred are not necessarily comparative across modes of resolution; the
benchmark against which an actual settlement outcome is measured is not
necessarily an outcome in another mode of resolution; it may be, for example,
a better settlement rather than an adjudicated outcome. Where there is actual
comparison with another dispute, the disputes compared are not necessarily
matched in important respects. In many cases, the other term of the compari-
son is imaginary.
Recently a few investigators have attempted to measure party satisfaction
in populations of small cases resolved by different modes. Craig McEwen and
Richard Maiman compared small claims courts in Maine in which cases were
mediated with courts where cases were adjudicated." They report a higher
level of satisfaction and sense of fairness among those whose cases were medi-
ated (less intimidating, more understandable, and afforded more opportunity
to explain their side, explore all issues, and vent and dissipate anger).' Sixty-
six percent (66%) of the mediated parties reported that they were completely
41. Id. at 592.
42. GALLUP ORGANIZATION, ATTITUDES TOWARD THE LIABILITY AND LITIGA-
TION SYSTEM: A SURVEY OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND BUSINESS EXECUTIVES 198
(1982). It should be noted that the question did not ask for a reading of their own
satisfaction, but for a surmise based on "what you know or may have heard [about]
how satisfied ... businesses that have been sued generally are . I.." "d  So we get only
a reading of the respondents' views of others' satisfaction. Id. It should also be noted
that the terms "settled out of court" and "brought to trial" do not demarcate precise
alternatives; they are neither exhaustive nor are they mutually exclusive, for a case
may be decisively adjudicated without trial and a case may be "settled" during or after
trial. Id.
43. Id.
44. McEwen & Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical As-
sessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237 (1981) [hereinafter Small Claims Mediation]; McEwen
& Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Con-
sent, 18 L & Soc'Y REV. 11 (1984) [hereinafter Mediation in Small Claims Court].
45. McEwen & Maiman, Small Claims Mediation, supra note 44, at 256-57.
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or mostly satisfied with their overall experience, compared to only 54% of the
adjudicated parties.' Mediated parties deemed their settlements fair 67.1 % of
the time; adjudicated parties only 59.0% of the time.41 These comparisons, it
should be noted, are of adjudicated cases with mediated ones, not with cases
that were settled by the parties themselves, so we do not know to what extent
the findings apply to settlements that were not obtained by this treatment.48
Neil Vidmar analyzed small claims cases in an Ontario county that were
subjected to a pre-trial "resolution hearing," comparing those that settled in
hearing and after hearing with those tried.4' He found that neither for plain-
tiffs nor defendants was satisfaction significantly related to whether the case
was settled or adjudicated; instead, satisfaction depended in large measure on
whether the hearing was perceived as fair."
In each of these pioneering and careful studies-the most systematic and
thorough that are available-the cases analyzed have been subjected to a spe-
cific form of intervention and it remains unclear how much the findings apply
to cases that settle after other processes. As in the other studies whose findings
are reported above, it remains uncertain how much any of these judgments of
satisfaction or fairness are attributable to differences in the process as opposed
to differences in the parties, their relations, and their disputes."
If discontent does not prove low quality, the occurrence of settlement (or
trial) cannot be taken as establishing that it is what the parties preferred or
that they see the outcome as optimal. The choice of settlement (or trial) is a
choice in a context of limited knowledge, strategic exigency, and a limited set
of perceived alternatives. These limitations should caution us against equating
party choice to settle or to litigate with an informed affirmation of the quality
of the process itself.
3. Responsiveness to party needs. The argument that settlement is "more
responsive to the parties' needs than adjudication"' 2 implies that settlement
does more than maximize party preferences or satisfaction. In the passage
46. Id. at 257.
47. Id.
48. McEwen and Maiman provide no separate data on the satisfaction of the
small sub-sample that settle on their own. A later paper of theirs presents data about
compliance which suggest that mediated cases behave differently than those which set-
tle without mediation. See McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court,
supra note 44, at 28.
49. See Vidmar, supra note 24, at 138-39.
50. Id.
51. Consider the suggestive finding of McEwen and Maiman of an "intriguing
negative relationship between the length of mediation and the proportion of cases in
which both parties believe the settlement fair .... This proportion drops by half as
mediations increase roughly from an average of twenty minutes to an average of forty
minutes in length." McEwen & Maiman, Small Claims Mediation, supra note 44, at
259.
52. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 20, at 504.
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cited above, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, the chief proponent of the needs argu-
ment, suggests some of the mechanisms by which settlement fulfills needs-by
engaging participation and consent in a more flexible procedure, promoting
direct communications, avoiding binary win/lose results, and accommodating
non-monetary claims.58 Settlement is commended because these features pro-
vide a setting within which "problem-solving negotiation" can achieve optimal
results. That settlement is more responsive to needs is part of a prescriptive
argument for this style of negotiation. It asserts that good negotiation can
achieve the satisfaction of parties' needs. It is not clear how far its proponents
would assert that, holding case characteristics equal, the settlements negoti-
ated by the negotiators who populate the world today actually achieve such
results to a greater degree than cases that are adjudicated.
To mount such a showing would involve many of the difficulties of match-
ing cases that plague all these comparisons. But the needs argument requires,
in addition, that the needs which are being responded to be ascertained. In-
deed, such a specification of needs is necessary not only for the investigator,
but for the negotiator herself, who must inventory her client's needs, including
social, psychological, and ethical needs as well as economic ones, and latent as
well as stated ones." It is not superficial preferences that must be identified,
but the "basic needs" or "actual needs" or "underlying human needs" of the
parties.5 ' In order to engage in problem-solving negotiation, the lawyer must
first ascertain her clients' underlying needs or objectives. In addition, the law-
yer may want to explore whether there are unstated objectives, pursue those
which she thinks appropriate to the situation, or probe the legitimacy and pro-
priety of particular goals."
Thus, the claim that settlement is superior asserts that it is more respon-
sive to needs that are "appropriate" and "legitimate" and "proper." We are
not told how the problem-solving negotiator is going to select these authentic
needs from inappropriate, illegitimate, and improper ones. In short, insofar as
the needs argument implies departure from getting for people more of what
they think they want, it implies a vision of what they ought to want. Until that
vision is revealed, it is difficult to assess the needs argument as such. But some
of the features connected with it (e.g., avoidance of binary results) turn up in
the other headings that we consider.
B. The Cost Reduction Arguments
Settlement is sometimes favored as the source of an outcome that is in-
trinsically superior to that produced by adjudication. But there is another fain-
53. Id.
54. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation:- The Struc-
ture of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 801-04 (1984).
55. Id. at 795-96.
56. Id. at 804.
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ily of arguments for the attractiveness of settlement-that it can achieve com-
parable results at lower cost-taking cost broadly to include expense, delay,
uncertainty, aggravation, and all the negative features that come with
disputing.
4. Party Savings. Cost savings are probably the benefit most widely at-
tributed to settlements and most commonly used to judge the quality of settle-
ments. It seems probable that settlement generally does involve less expendi-
ture of resources than adjudication. But does settlement achieve results or
outcomes that are "comparable" to the outcome of adjudication? Suppose
that, for the moment, we ignore any wide "public" effects and define a "com-
parable" outcome as an outcome that leaves the parties in the same position as
if the matter had been pursued to verdict and judgment. Under this condition,
the claimant receives the present value of the expected judgment, appropri-
ately discounted for uncertainty, delay, and cost avoided. The defendant gives
up what he would have given at judgment with appropriate discount for cost
and risk avoided and appropriate premiums for earlier payment and elimina-
tion of uncertainty. Each party comes out approximately where he would have
been had the adjudication been fully played out with existing barriers of cost,
delay, and uncertainty in place. Adjudication with its existing transaction
costs is taken as providing the standard of quality. A settlement is of higher
quality than adjudication if at least one of the parties would prefer it to such
an adjudication, the other being indifferent.
Take the following numerical example: suppose we have a claim for $100
made by A against B. Suppose the claim is so certain to be upheld that we can
for the moment ignore uncertainty. Suppose it will cost each party $20 to
adjudicate the claim and 0 to settle it; and suppose that it will take one year to
reach a result by adjudication and that having the $100 for that year repre-
sents a gain of $5 to B and a corresponding loss of $5 to A. The net position
after adjudication is thus:
A B
+100 claim paid -100
- 20 expenses - 20
- 5 interest on $ + 5
+ 75 NET OUTCOME -115
Since A's expected net outcome from litigation is only $75, any amount
greater than that is a preferable result (putting aside for the moment other
components of A's preference, such as wanting official vindication or maxi-
mum injury to B or public benefit, such as warning or precedent). And since
B's expected expenditure if there is adjudication is $115, any amount less than
that is preferable to B (making the same diminishing assumptions about pref-
erences). Hence, for both parties, each point between $76 and $114 is prefera-
ble to the result of adjudication.
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In real life, parties' estimates of the value of the claim typically do not
coincide. Where they do not overlap, we would, in the absence of transaction
costs, not expect that settlement would occur. But the presence of transaction
costs can create a "settlement range" even in the absence of overlapping esti-
mates. Suppose we modify our example, so that A believes he has a 100%
chance of receiving $110 and B believes he has a 100% chance of being liable
for $90. In a world without transaction costs, there is no "settlement range" of
points that both parties would prefer to adjudication. But if we introduce the
transaction costs we had above, we see the following:
A B
+110 expected claim - 90
- 20 expenses - 20
- 5 interest on $ + 5
+ 75 NET OUTCOME -115
The settlement range is smaller than in the earlier example, but unlike
the imaginary world without transaction costs, there is a settlement
range--one produced entirely by the presence of transaction costs. If those
costs increased, the settlement range would increase correspondingly. Thus, we
see that there is an important link between transaction costs and settlement. If
we increase transaction costs-by more delay, more expensive lawyers or ex-
perts, etc., the area of overlap and the settlement range is extended. Not only
does settlement become theoretically possible in more cases, but the range of
possible settlement points is extended.
But why should we define the quality of settlements against a standard
that incorporates existing transaction costs? Imagine instead a full entitlement
or just deserts standard in which the measure of a quality settlement would be
that the parties receive/relinquish their full legal entitlements without the dis-
counts imposed by the transaction cost barriers. (Recovery of lawyers' ex-
penses by winning parties is one instance of such a principle). The highest
quality settlement in this view would be one that gave the parties what they
were entitled to, but spared them or compensated them for the cost of getting
it (i.e., that secured a just claim net or saved one free of the cost of defeating
an unjust claim).
But this "full entitlement" or "just deserts" standard leads us to a para-
dox. In a world with transaction costs that consume the private resources of
the parties, adjudication cannot produce such results. We can adjust the rules
to produce such a result for one of the parties-by a capacious application of
the principle of having the losing party bear the expenses of the winner. But if
we try to imagine such a result for both parties, we encounter a paradox. In
our example, A should get $100 and B should pay $100. The $5 interest could
be taken care of simply by a transfer payment (this is pre-judgment interest),
but the expenses pose a problem. If we have an expense shifting statute, then
16
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A achieves his full recovery of $100, but B is -$140, $20 or $40 below what he
"deserved" to lose-unless we believe he deserved to bear all the expense inci-
dent to resisting A's claim." The presence of transaction costs means that we
can move one party closer to the "full" position only by either moving the
other party further away or by getting a third party to bear these costs.
Transaction costs mean that legal remedies will never leave the parties
taken together in as good a position as their substantive legal entitlements/
obligations entitle them. Settlement can reduce the amount of transaction
costs, but it cannot eliminate the paradox they introduce-that the distributive
outcome always involves some departure from full legal entitlements/obliga-
tions. That is, in a world of transaction costs, adjudication imposes a new "de-
parture from equity" in the very act of curing a larger departure.
The question is does settlement merely reproduce the "departure from
equity" that pervades adjudication or does it redistribute it? Imagine our ex-
ample again. Suppose A and B settle for $80. Both parties are better off than
they would be by adjudicating in a world of transaction costs. But if we com-
pare their positions to the paradoxical world of full entitlements (just deserts),
we see that A is $20 worse off than he deserves, but B is $20 or $40 or $60
better off than he deserves, as measured by the notion of full entitlements/
obligations." Thus, settlement has the paradoxical quality of improving the
position of X in terms of his real world expectations of recovery, while worsen-
ing his position vis-a-vis Y in terms of the relation of the outcome to their
respective undiscounted deserts. The real position of both parties has improved
relative to their expectations of recovery/expenditure, but there is a sharp dif-
ference in the way this improvement is related to their underlying deserts. X
achieves a small improvement of results at the cost of accepting an outcome
far short of his deserts; Y achieves a large improvement of results that puts
him much better off than indicated by the underlying deserts.
Settlements involve what Ian MacNeil refers to as the division of the "ex-
change surplus"-which he defines as "the total gain in utility perceived by
the two parties from the exchange itself as compared to not trading."'5 Each
party who enters a settlement has presumably perceived a gain for itself in
settling rather than continuing to litigate. In trading generally "[t]he availa-
bility of alternative arrangements .. . tends to bring about evenness in the
57. $20 on the assumption that the notion of deserts includes making up to X for
the expense of obtaining recovery. But does our notion of "deserts" stretch to include
all the costs incident to determining those deserts--costs which are influenced by the
expenditures of one's antagonist and largely independent of the merits of those deserts?
58. $60 if we think B's "deserts" include bearing all of the costs of the dispute;
$40 if we think they include only his own costs; $20 if they include bearing none of the
costs.
59. I. MAcNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 130 n.19 (1980).
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division of exchange-surplus."" But settlements are exchanges under condi-
tions of bilateral monopoly-plaintiff is the only plaintiff that defendant can
deal with and vice versa. The dissatisfied party cannot turn to an alternative
trading partner. So markets cannot be relied upon to produce evenness or mu-
tuality in the division of the exchange surplus. The only recourse is to adjudi-
cate-that is, to ask the court to prescribe the deal-a course with well-known
risks and costs which the parties have different abilities to bear.
Various factors may influence the way in which the "savings" are divided
between parties arranging settlements. The distribution of these savings may
reflect differences in experience, information, bargaining skill, and/or risk ad-
verseness. There is reason to think that some classes of litigants may capture a
greater share of the benefits of settlement than others." Thus, Ross in his
study of the negotiation of automobile injury claims finds that, overall,
claimants must yield substantial discounts to insurers, who enjoy the advan-
tages of being able to invest in principle, use commitment tactics, and be risk-
neutral in any given case. 63 Finally, the distributive consequences of settlement
may be affected by parties' differing relations to their bargaining agents, who
may capture a greater or lesser portion of the party's share of the savings from
settlement. Thus, lawyers working on a contingency fee may capture a dispro-
portionate share of the savings afforded by a settlement that obviates the need
to prepare for trial." So, while there are savings from settlement, the ability to
appropriate them is unevenly distributed.
Legal remedies are sought to overcome a present distribution that is out
of line with the parties' claimed entitlements; but the process of securing an
authoritative determination of those entitlements consumes resources so that
the resulting redistribution differs from that authoritative determination; set-
tlement permits the parties to reduce the exactions of transaction costs, but
because parties differ in their ability to secure shares of these savings, settle-
ment may add another layer of departure from equity.
5. Court savings. There has been a tremendous push in recent years to
encourage settlement with an eye to lowering the demands on courts. By defi-
nition, settlements mean there is less that courts have to do. Settlement may,
however, entail hidden costs for courts, for example, by depleting the supply of
precedents that facilitate decisions and induce settlements in later cases. These
costs are discussed below under the heading of general effects. But, if settle-
ments on the whole represent a gain for courts, it does not follow that judges
60. Id. at 45.
61. See generally Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'v REV. 95 (1975).
62. H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS (1970).
63. Id. at 211-15.
64. See D. ROSENTHAL. LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 98-99
(1974); P. HERMANN, BETTER SETTLEMENTS THROUGH LEVERAGE (1965).
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spending their time in promoting settlements leads to such gains. Simply, since
most cases will settle anyway, the results of applying judge time to settlement
promotion are hard to discern.
The few systematic studies provide no assurance that judicial promotion
of settlements produce more settlements or make courts more productive."
Although any increase in the portion of cases settled remains to be demon-
strated, it does appear that there has been a move toward more judicial in-
volvement. Cases that might have settled by negotiation between opposing
counsel are not settled with the participation of the judge, or other court func-
tionary. Does that make any difference? Do settlements promoted by judges
differ systematically from those produced by bilateral negotiation? Do they
display more of the qualities that makes one settlement "superior" to another
or to adjudication? These questions have remained largely unexplored and
these assertions of superior quality have remained largely unexamined.
Measurement of the effects of judicial intervention is rendered difficult,
perhaps confounded beyond all hope, by the patterning effect of institutional-
ized judicial settlement participation. If judges regularly participate in settle-
ments, it is likely that some patterning will take place-"benchmarks" for lia-
bility and damages will be established; common lore will circulate; notions of
what sort of cases deserve to be tried and which do not will be communicated
to (and perhaps internalized by) the lawyers. One imagines much of this
would carry over into bilateral settlement negotiations, for lawyers in these
negotiations would not tolerate less favorable deals than they believe would
emerge in a readily-available, judicially-supervised settlement session. Thus,
institutionalized judicial settlement has effects which radiate and affect bilat-
eral settlement. Comparison of cases in a given court between those settled in
judicially-sponsored conferences and those settled bilaterally is not a compari-
son with what the latter would be like in the absence of the institutionalized
judicial settlement. Even a random assignment strategy would not fully obvi-
ate this obstacle to experimental comparison." Thus, any ascertainment of the
net effects of judicial intervention is both difficult and tenuous in the conclu-
sion that it will support.
C. The Superior Outcomes Arguments
6. Golden mean. Settlement typically involves arrival at a position be-
65. See generally T. CHURCH, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN
URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978); Flanders, Case Management in Federal Courts: Some
Controversies and Some Results, 4 JUST. Sys. J. 147, 161 (1978); Gillespie, The Pro-
duction of Court Services: An Analysis of Scale Effects and Other Factors, 5 J. LEGAL
STUD. 243, 252-63 (1976); Goldman, The Preappeal Conference and Effective Justice,
I L. & POL'Y Q. 101, 114 (1979).
66. Comparison could be made with other research designs: interrupted time se-
ries or comparison of otherwise similar jurisdictions, but these carry all the burdens of
matching that are discussed above.
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tween the original offer and demands of the parties. As such, it involves a
process of compromise in the sense that each has sacrificed some part of his
claim in order to secure part. Is this a mark of superiority?
Ultimately, the persuasiveness of such an assertion depends on believing
that the underlying merits are not wholly or overwhelmingly on one side and,
in addition, that the outcome should reflect the proportional distribution of
those merits rather than a predominance." Alternatively, it may be asserted
that the process of compromise in itself introduces a value that outweighs any
loss in proportionality of outcome to "merits.""
It is easy, however, to be defected from the need to supply a deep justifi-
cation for compromise in a setting inhabited by professional advocates whose
stock in trade is exaggerating claims. Where the negotiating game is played by
the parties making extreme claims, a decision maker may ordinarily assume
that the solution lies between the stated positions of the parties. The results of
adjudication as well as those of settlement usually fall between the most ex-
treme claims of the parties. But this pervasive exaggeration provides no assur-
ance to the proponent of settlement that any given point between those ex-
tremes reflects a solution that bears a proportional relationship to the
underlying merits of a "mutual" division of the savings generated by the set-
tlement itself. As we noted above, there may be systematic disparities in the
capacity to influence the location of outcomes along a settlement range. There-
fore, the golden mean argument has to be supplemented with some suggestion
of the mechanism by which settlements reflect the merits or a fair division of
the "exchange surplus."
7. Superior knowledge. One means by which settlement might reflect the
merits is suggested by the notion that it is based on superior knowledge of the
facts and the parties' preferences. Presumably each of the parties who negoti-
ate a settlement knows its own preferences better than a third-party decision
maker. One might imagine that the negotiation process would give some indi-
cation of the other side's priorities (although there are instances of tactical use
of deliberate deception about priorities). But what reason is there to think that
settlement negotiation would produce more knowledge of the facts? Eisenberg
suggests that "the modes of fact-determination associated with traditional ad-
judication may be not only less efficient but actually less reliable than those
associated with dispute-negotiation." 6' Fact determinations associated with ad-
judication are expensive and wasteful, and constricted by rules of privilege and
evidence that effectuate other policies; but they make available to the parties a
67. See Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt
and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 750, 794 (1964).
68. Something like this seems to be the position of McThenia and Shaffer who
see settlement as part of "a process of reconciliation" that draws on and gives expres-
sion to values that lie beyond those embodied in the law. See McThenia and Shaffer,
For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1975).
69. Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 658.
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broad inquisitorial power to conduct "detailed and sustained inquiry into the
facts"'7 and the results can be tested by adversarial contention. Of course,
dispute-negotiation under the shadow of adjudication benefits from use of
these devices. It is possible to point to richly-informed settlements and poorly-
informed adjudications, but there is no intrinsic reason why the former should
be more typical.
8. Normative richness. Another candidate for the linkage of settlement to
the merits is the notion that settlements are more principled, i.e., that they are
infused with a wider range of norms and permit the actors to be loyal to a
wider range of normative concerns. Eisenberg, contrasting the negotiation of
disputes with their adjudication, concludes that negotiation can take into ac-
count a richer array of normative principles, while adjudication typically ex-
cludes at least some of the principles that the disputants themselves regard as
relevant. 71 Thus, "traditional adjudication may actually be a less principled
process than dispute-negotiation.""
Eisenberg asserts that "in most cases of dispute-negotiation the outcome
is heavily determined by the principles, rules, and precedents that parties in-
voke. 17 In adjudication, he argues there is a distinction between the process
of reaching an outcome and the justifications used to rationalize it, but in
negotiation "a broad spectrum of norms can be taken into account in a wide
variety of ways.""14 Adjudication is less principled since some principles are
excluded from consideration." If a greater range of authoritative normative
learning is invoked and the outcome is "heavily determined" by this learning,
then presumably that outcome can be taken to reflect "the merits." Thus, Ei-
senberg tells us that "such factors as prominence, personal force, and risk
preference" affect the outcome "within the leeways left by principles, rules
and precedents."'17
I have not encountered any attempt to verify this by systematic observa-
tion. Eisenberg himself gives two examples of the richly principled outcomes
produced by negotiation. Both his examples, one taken from an incident in
Indonesia reported by Dan Lev7' and the other from Gulliver's account of the
70. Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Foregoing the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 575, 599 (1986).
71. Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 657.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 639. Fisher and Ury's prescriptive program for "principled negotia-
tion" might be taken as advice for learning how to give principle this determinative
effect. But such an undertaking presumably starts from an assumption that this effect
is not already present in "most cases." R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGO-
TIATION AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 11-14 (1981).
74. Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 655.
75. Id. at 657.
76. Id. at 665 n.81.
77. Id. at 647-48.
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Arusha,78 involve continuing and multiplex relations between at least some of
the parties-a factor which he does not identify as a variable. We may then
wonder how strongly we can generalize from these cases in which bargaining
is under the shadow of threatened loss of valued relationships to instances in
which bargaining is under the shadow of threatened legal sanctions. In any
event, these examples invite us to examine Eisenberg's claim that normative
learning "determines" outcome. Is this a "strong" claim of determina-
tion-i.e., that the full repertoire of principles invoked led inexorably to this
result? Or, is he making a much weaker claim of "determination"-that an
Arusha looking at a negotiated outcome could see each element as application
of a respectable norm (i.e., one approved for use in some circumstances).7 '
It seems to me that it is only the "weak" determination claim that can
plausibly be made. The outcome of these negotiations is determined by the
principles invoked in the same way that this paragraph is determined by the
rules of English grammar and composition. Users of English would recognize
it as an application of accepted rules. It cannot be understood without taking
those rules into account. But, at the same time, the existing body of rules
could have been applied in many other ways. The rules of baseball "deter-
mine" and constitute the game in this sense, but they do not determine the
outcome of individual games.
The norm-centered view of dispute negotiation is not susceptible of direct
testing. But there is some suggestive evidence to show that it exaggerates the
determinative power of norms. Simulations of negotiations and case evalua-
tions display the enormous variation of results when legal norms (and known
facts) are held constant. In simulated negotiations of a personal injury case by
fourteen sets of experienced Des Moines attorneys, Gerald Williams found
that "the outcomes ranged from a high of $95,000 to a low of $15,000; the
average outcome was just over $47,000; and the remainder of the outcomes
are scattered almost randomly between the two extremes."'" A similar varia-
78. Id. at 646.
79. Id.
80. G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 6 (1983). Williams re-
ports that he:
obtained the cooperation of 40 practicing lawyers in Des Moines, Iowa, who
agreed to be divided into 20 pairs and to prepare and undertake settlement
negotiations in personal injury case. Approximately two weeks in advance of
the negotiations, the attorneys were randomly assigned to represent either the
plaintiff or the defendant (as counsel for his insurance company). Attorneys
assigned to represent the plaintiff were given identical case files, as were at-
torneys assigned to the defense. Under the facts it was assumed that the case
arose in Iowa, Iowa law applied, and if the case went to trial it would be tried
to a jury in Des Moines, Iowa. To assure comparability of predicted jury
awards, photocopies of comparable jury awards from the Des Moines area
were included in the case files for both sides, [and] participating lawyers
were informed that results of the negotiations would be published, with attor-
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bility is evident in Douglas Rosenthal's research on personal injury settlements
in New York City. 1 Rosenthal asked a panel of five experts to estimate from
a file what each of 59 actual settled cases was worth in terms of settlement at
various stages and at the time of the jury award.82 Panelist estimates varied
considerably among themselves and from the actual settlements, which ranged
from more than twice the panel consensus to just one-sixth of it.ss Again, this
suggests that information about norms and facts did not, in and of itself, pro-
duce convergence on outcome.
A similar looseness in connection between norms and outcomes was found
by Robert Condlin, who examined transcripts of arguments by approximately
one hundred teams of law students in simulated negotiation of a lawsuit." He
concluded that negotiators' experience, preparation, and intellectual abilities
"along with tolerance for conflict, stamina, ruthlessness, oratorical skill, and
emotional force, play as large a role in determining the extent to which norms
are invoked and elaborated as do qualities inherent in the norms
themselves.""
Accounts of the negotiation that takes place in connection with litigation
in the contemporary United States raises doubts about the claim of normative
richness as well as the claim of strong determination. My examples are the
Agent Orange settlement described by Schuck" and the settlement of the Buf-
falo Creek disaster cases described by Stern.87 In each case, the settlement
avoided definitive resolution on causation, responsibility, degrees of blame,
norms for future conduct and so forth in favor of summation of all unresolved
matters in terms of a single sum of money. These are large and complex cases
involving multiple parties and issues and might be thought unrepresentative of
smaller and simpler cases. But Ross' study of automobile accident settlements
reports a reduction of normative complexity in negotiation, an abandonment of
the individualized proof demanded by the law, and a substitution of mechani-
ney names attached, among the participants at the workshop. This meant the
attorneys had their professional reputations riding on the outcomes.
Id. (emphasis in original). After the attorneys negotiated their settlements, 14 of the 20
pairs were willing to submit a signed statements of results. The full table of results can
be found id. at 7.
81. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 64.
82. Id. at 36-37.
83. Id. at 202-07.
84. Condlin, 'Cases on Both Sides: Patterns of Argument in Legal Dispute-Ne-
gotiation, 44 MD. L. REV. 65, 66 (1985). He detected "no strong correlation" between
argument and outcome. Id. at 132.
85. Id. at 131.
86. P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS (1986).
87. G. STERN. THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER: How SURVIVORS OF ONE OF THE
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cal formulas (like "three times specials" as a measure of damages for pain and
suffering or which car hit the other from the rear as a formula for assigning
fault)." Distinctions and subtleties are washed out.8"
9. Inventiveness. Settlement is credited with the availability of a wider
range of outcomes. It permits various intermediate outcomes rather than the
"all or none" result specified by the law.' 0 But there is an additional and im-
portant claim: that settlement permits greater flexibility and inventiveness in
devising outcomes and remedies. Where antagonists are involved in continuing
relations, settlement is more likely, it is claimed, to lead to restoration of
maintenance of the relationship. And beyond this, settlement may lead to an
"integrative" solution. This refers to various kinds of solutions in which the
original "pie" is enlarged rather than divided. Donald Gifford,91 drawing on
the work of Pruitt, lists several types:
[t]he most dramatic integrative solution emerges when the parties "brain-
storm" and develop a new option that satisfies the significant needs of both
parties. The second type... is often referred to as "logrolling." In logrolling,
each negotiator agrees to make concessions on some issues while his counter-
part concedes on other issues; the agreement reconciles the parties' interests
to the extent that the parties have different priorities on the issues .... An-
other form of integrative bargaining is described . . .as "cost cutting." A
negotiator ... may find ways to diminish the tangible or intangible costs to
the opponent."2
There is extensive literature on integrative or problem-solving bargaining
styles and the extent to which they can be utilized in negotiating legal dis-
putes. 8 It is generally conceded that integrative bargaining strategies are
88. Ross, supra note 62, at 107-11, 161-62, 239-40.
89. Id. at 134-35. Kritzer found that the median amount of time lawyers spend
on settlement negotiations in ordinary civil cases was about three hours. This varied
little by area of law.
[O]nly 15% of lawyers reported that 'their case' involved three or more ex-
changes [of offers and demands.] (17) Lest Ross's accident cases be thought
to involve unrepresentatively simple bargaining, it should be noted that
Kritzer found that tort cases involved the most intensive bargaining. More
than twice as high a portion of tort cases involved three of more exchanges
than did cases in any other area of law.
Kritzer, The Form of Negotiation in Ordinary Litigation, WORKING PAPER 7-2, Dis-
putes Processing Research Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison (1986).
90. According to Friesen, "[t]rials are subject to positive right and wrong conclu-
sions. Settlements can take into account the broader range of potential just results."
Friesen, Internal Organizations and Procedures of the Court, in STATE COURTS: A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE 186 (T.J. Fetter ed. 1978).
91. Gifford, A Context Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotia-
tion, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 55 (1985).
92. Id. at 55-56.
93. See FISHER & URY, supra note 73; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 54, at 754-
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more readily applicable "where either an identifiable mutual gain option is
available or multiple issues which can be traded off against one another ex-
ist." 94 On the other hand, "it is less useful when the parties disagree only
about a single issue and the parties' interests are inherently opposed."'9 This
suggests that the opportunities for integrative solutions may be rare in many
kinds of legal claims, such as personal injury claims or debt actions. Inventive
minds can find integrative possibilities even in such unpromising soil." But
settlement can be institutionalized without availing of these possibilities very
often. Thus, McEwen and Maiman report that in their Maine small claims
court mediations:
[clontrary to the expectation that flexible and creative settlements would oc-
cur, few mediation agreements (only 12 %) in Maine have involved any condi-
tions besides payment. This is not because other issues were never present in
these disputes; respondents in 40% of the mediated cases reported the pres-
ence of "other issues" besides money in their dispute. It appears, however,
that with few exceptions such matters were converted into dollars and cents
for purposes of the agreement."
Even where integrative solutions are theoretically available, the organiza-
tion of legal services may discourage recourse to them. Kritzer points out that
where the claimant is represented by a lawyer who is paid a portion of the
recovery, there is a tendency to avoid outcomes that do not create a fund of
cash out of which the lawyer can be paid (e.g., reinstatement, agreement to
desist, etc.)."'
If genuine integrative solutions are less frequent than we might hope,
high transaction costs and broad settlement ranges make it increasingly easy
to meet the test of what might be called a weak integrative solution--one in
which, because of transaction costs, both parties come out better by settling
than by litigating." But as we have seen, these bring in their train a new set of
distributive problems among claimants and between claimants and their
agents.
10. More compliance. For a dispute resolution to elicit the compliance of
the parties is a virtue. McEwen and Maiman conclude that parties are more
likely to comply with dispositions reached by consensual process (negotiation
and mediation) rather than by a coercive process like adjudication. 00 Vidmar,
842.
94. Gifford, supra note 91, at 56.
95. Id. at 56-57.
96. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 54.
97. McEwen & Maiman, Small Claims Mediation, supra note 44, at 253.
98. See Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Negotiation, 21 L. & Soc'v REv. 341
(1987).
99. The prevalence of weak integrative solutions, easily conflated with highly
prized true integrative solutions, helps nourish the ideology that settlement is intrinsi-
cally good.
100. McEwen & Maiman. Small Claims Mediation, supra note 44, at 261.
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who also finds lower rates of compliance in adjudicated cases, argues that this
is best understood as an effect of selection-i.e., that cases in which defend-
ants admit partial liability are more likely to comply and these are the cases
that tend to be successfully mediated."' For our purposes, we should note that
hardly any of this compliance data isolates settlement per se from mediation.
Where McEwen and Maiman separate negotiated settlements from mediated
and adjudicated results, we see they have a pattern that is distinct from either
negotiated outcomes displaying lower rates of full compliance than mediated
outcomes, but lower rates of non-compliance than adjudicated outcomes. 02 Fi-
nally, we should recall that the consensual processes examined in these studies
are not free-standing, but work in the shadow of the coercive process.
If settlement does indeed succeed in fostering compliance to the agreed
outcome, we might ask what it does to the underlying norm whose alleged
violation gave rise to the dispute (pay your debts, take precaution to injuring
others, and so forth). Does a dispute mechanism that produces more compli-
ance with the dispute outcome by a particular defendant also produce more
compliance with the underlying norm by that defendant or by others? Until
now all of the supposed good features of settlement in our catalog have been
virtues located within the universe made up of the "case" and the "dispu-
tants." But courts (and other dispute resolvers) do more than resolve disputes;
they broadcast messages to various audiences about the conduct of disputes
and about the norms of conduct underlying those disputes. Any evaluation of
settlement must take account of the effects of these messages as well as effects
on the immediate parties.
11. Superior general effects. Most of the contributions to our anthology
focus on the way that settlements affect individual cases and their partici-
pants; they measure the "special effects" of the settlement process. By special
effects I refer to the effects produced by dispute processing on the parties im-
mediately involved-such effects as compensation, avoidance of expense, satis-
faction, and compliance. But in addition to a variety of effects on the actors
involved in a dispute, there may be other effects on wider audiences through
the communication to others of information about that dispute processing (and
about responses to that information). These I call "general effects. 10 8
101. See Vidmar, The Small Claims Court: A Reconceptualization of Disputes
and an Empirical Investigation, 18 L. & Soc'y REV. 515, 542-45 (1984). McEwen and
Maiman see this as merely specifying the conditions under which forum makes a differ-
ence. McEwen & Maiman, The Relative Significance of Disputing Forum and Dispute
Characteristics for Outcome and Compliance, 20 L. & Soc'y REV. 439 (1986).
102. McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court, supra note 44, at
28.
103. This notion of "general effects" takes off from the very helpful discussion of
general preventive effects of punishment by J. GIBBS. CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETER-
RENCE (1975), as usefully elaborated by Feeley, The Concept of Laws in Social Sci-
ence: A Critique and Notes on an Expanded View, 10 L. & Soc'Y REV. 497, 517-21
(1976). It is simply a generalization from the illuminating and now familiar (if not
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Every case has possible general effects-as a precedent, deterrent, rein-
forcement, etc. In assessing the quality of different instances or rival modes of
dispute processing, we should enlarge our focus from consideration only of the
results among the two parties (and the forum) to consider the kinds of effects
they have on others-on parties in other cases, parties in similar situations
who have not brought suit, parties who will be affected by the patterns of
activity of those in the plaintiff and defendant classes, and so forth. Thus in
assessing the quality of a settlement or a pattern of settlements, there is a
question of whether the settlement or the pattern radiates general effects of a
scope and magnitude comparable to those of an adjudicated outcome or pat-
tern of outcomes. This notion is easy to grasp in the case of a bargained
plea--does it have a deterrent effect comparable to trial and sentence after
trial? Indeed in plea bargaining, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in-
struct the judge to employ such a standard. 104 A comparable assessment is
sometimes undertaken in the settlement of antitrust or other cases where the
private right is clearly thought to be invested with a public interest.
Adjudication produces general effects at least some of which are public
goods. If we view the production of these public goods as a valued component
of the dispute process, we may ask whether settlement does not deprive the
public of these goods, allowing the coercive power of state to be used to gener-
ate private goods (special effects) without the accompanying public goods
(general effects)? Outcomes may have effects as precedents or signals even if
arrived at by settlement rather than adjudicating. Settlements may have gen-
eral effects-for example, when they become known as "benchmarks," broad-
casting guidelines about liability and damages.
The production of general effects depends on the flow of information.
Where information about the existence or terms of a settlement is prevented
from circulating publicly, as by the typical agreement that the terms of settle-
entirely serviceable, as Gibbs points out) distinction between special deterrence and
general deterrence introduced by Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punish-
ment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1966). Theory about these general effects is still incho-
ate. In a review of the now sizeable literature on deterrence, Gibbs observes that since
deterrence research has proceeded without controls for other general effects, "all previ-
ous purported tests of the deterrence doctrine . . . are tests of an implicit theory of
general preventive effects; and such will remain the case as long as nondeterrent mech-
anisms are left uncontrolled." Gibbs, The Deterrence Doctrine: Theory, Research and
Penal Policy in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 347ff (1986) (L. Lipson & S.
Wheeler, eds.). The literature on the effects of tort law displays the same conflation of
deterrence with other preventive effects that Gibbs finds in the criminal law literature.
Some of the labels used here for the various effects are inspired by (but disloyal to)
those carefully discussed by Gibbs in The Deterrence Doctrine, supra. A fuller taxon-
omy of the effects of litigation can be found in Galanter, The Radiating Effects of
Courts in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 124-42 (1983) (K. Boyum & L.
Mather, eds.).
104. FED. R. CalM. P. I1(b).
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ment are confidential, the general effects are weakened. Where parties and
lawyers receive benefits in exchange for the suppression of information about
settlements, we have what amounts to the appropriation for private benefit of
the public goods produced by the dispute process.
V. CONCLUSION
Settlement is not an "alternative" process, separate from adjudication,
but is intimately and inseparably entwined with it. Both may be thought of as
aspects of a single process of strategic maneuver and bargaining in the (actual
or threatened) presence of the adjudicative forum, to which I have attached
the fanciful neologism "litigotiation."I'"
We began with the observation that most litigation ends with settlement.
This seems to be largely independent of self-conscious efforts to promote set-
tlements.'" It seems unlikely that the portion of disputes ending in settlement
will decrease in the near future. Demand for adjudication-backed remedies is
increasing faster than the supply of facilities for full-blown adjudication. More
generally, the costs of litigotiation are rising and this tends to produce
settlements.
As the society gets richer, the stakes in disputes become higher and more
organizations and individuals can make greater investments in litigation. Ex-
penditures on one side produce costs on the other. Again, as the law becomes
more voluminous, more complex, and more uncertain, costs increase. Virtually
every "improvement" in adjudication-refinements of due process that require
more submissions, hearings, and findings; elaborations of the law that require
research, investigation, and evidence; provision of additional services by spe-
cialized experts-increases the need and opportunity for greater expenditures.
As transaction barriers (time, resources, uncertainty about recovery and its
amount) rise, there is more chance of overlap in the bargaining position of the
parties. There is more of a "settlement range" in which both parties are better
off than in running the full course of adjudication.
As settlement ranges are extended, actors face the problem of how to
reach agreement within the settlement range. The recent proliferation of set-
tlement brokers (judges, mediators, special masters) and devices (mini-trials,
summary jury trials, etc.) testifies to the increasing demand for signals to
identify points of convergence within the broad settlement ranges created by
higher transaction costs.
Settlements are not intrinsically good or bad, anymore than adjudication
is good or bad. Settlements do not share any generic traits that commend us to
avoid them per se or to promote them. Which does not mean that some settle-
ments are not preferable to some adjudications-and to some other settle-
105. Galanter, World of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Pro-
cess, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268 (1984).
106. See Galanter, Settlement Judge, supra note 3, at 8-9.
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ments. Measured by the various criteria we have examined, there is great vari-
ation in the quality of settlements from one disputing arena to another and
within such arenas.107
When we think about trials, we are concerned not only that trials occur,
but that they be of high quality, meeting standards of fair procedure and ben-
eficial outcome. The occurrence of a settlement is in itself no more a guarantee
of a quality result than is occurrence of a trial per se. So, it is necessary to
take thought how to produce settlements of high quality. This is a task not
only for those who negotiate settlements, but for those who intervene in them
(e.g., mediators) and those who formulate policy that affects the settlement
process.
The task for policy is not promoting settlements, or discouraging them,
but regulating them. How do we encourage settlements that display the quali-
ties we favor? In large measure the answer is that we don't know and that
developing reliable knowledge of the quality of settlements is fraught with dif-
ficulties. That there is a lot we don't know about settlement is not an excuse
for doing nothing until the results of further research are in. Existing knowl-
edge supplies some useful ideas about where to look and what to look for.
Because settlement is intimately bound to litigation, settlement outcomes
reflect in some measure the potential results and costs of litigation. Substan-
tive and procedural rules, and the practices of courts and lawyers, confer bar-
gaining endowments upon the parties in settlement negotiations.108 Power to
achieve an attractive settlement may be dependent on having adjudication as a
viable alternative. 1"s Even those who emphasize the power of principle in nego-
tiation concede that "the relative negotiating power of two parties depends
primarily upon how attractive to each is the option of not reaching
agreement."'11
Settlements depend not only on the bargaining endowments that parties
107. The concept of bargaining arenas (i.e., more or less bounded constellations
of negotiators) "who interact with one another in connection with the settlement (and
occasional adjudication) of particular kinds of cases in a particular locality .... [and]
share (more or less) expectations and understandings about procedures, applicable
norms, outcomes ... ." is sketched in Galanter, Worlds of Deals, supra note 105, at
272.
108. See generally Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms, supra note 27; Mnookin
& Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, supra note 12.
109. McEwen and Maiman observe that good settlement opportunities may de-
pend on. availability of adjudication.
[Tihe most important cost of rules and procedures that deny the poor and
weak access to adjudication may be that the disadvantaged are thus effec-
tively denied the opportunity to settle claims informally. The expansion of
legal rights and resources for disadvantaged parties enhances their ability to
impose costs and risks and thus to bargain effectively.
McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court, supra note 44, at 46.
110. FISHER & URY, supra note 73, at 106.
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bring to the negotiating arena, but on the institutions of the particular bar-
gaining arena that translate endowments into outcomes. The features of the
arena also offer possibilities for policy intervention: the skills and styles of the
negotiators, the ethical constraints under which they operate; the presence
of mediators or other settlement facilitators; the review of negotiation results
by third parties (as, for example, in the fairness hearings held in class actions
and in cases involving minors); requirements about publicity and disclosure,
and so forth.
How does the presence or absence of these devices affect the costs of the
process? How does it affect the distribution of the "savings" produced by the
settlement? How does it affect the "general effects" or "public goods" pro-
duced by the settlement? Are settlements in a particular arena improved by
detaching them from litigation, for example by removing them into different
institutions? Or, are they improved by coupling them more closely to litiga-
tion, for example by summary jury trials before the fact or fairness hearings
afterward?
Most remedy-seeking in the vicinity of courts is going to eventuate in
settlement. Assuring the quality of these settlements is a central task of the
administration of justice. It is time to move beyond uncritical celebration and
equally uncritical condemnation of settlement and to grapple with the complex
dynamics of the various species of settlements in different bargaining arenas.
I 11. On the failure of the bar to institute ethical regulation of lawyer negotiat-
ing, see American Bar Association, supra note 11, at 35-42; White, Machiavelli and
the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 926
(1980); Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy when Dealing with Op-
posing Parties, 33 S.CL. REV. 181 (1981).
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